In 2009-2010, the Somali militant group al-Shabab controlled most of central and southern Somalia south of the autonomous region of Puntland. Since the February 2011 military offensives by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Somali government troops, and Somali Sufi militia forces, al-Shabab has suffered a series of significant territorial and strategic setbacks.1 Pressures on the insurgent movement increased when Kenya and Ethiopia, together with client Somali militias, invaded its southern and western strongholds in October and November 2011. The Kenyan military’s goal from the onset of its campaign inside Somalia was to seize the vital port city of Kismayo, one of al-Shabab’s most important economic centers.2 Kenya seized control of that city in October 2012. Ethiopian troops and their Somali allies quickly captured the Ethiopia-Somalia border town of Beledweyne, and within two months had also captured the city of Baidoa in western Somalia.3
These setbacks necessitated a shift in al-Shabab’s military strategy. This article assesses the trajectory of both al-Shabab’s military and political strategies, explains how defections have weakened the group, and reviews its information and media operations during the past two years in the midst of its relatively rapid territorial losses.
Pressure on Three Fronts: North, South and West
Al-Shabab, bolstered by initial military victories and the continued corruption and ineptness plaguing the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), launched major frontline assaults against AMISOM and TFG positions in the divided city of Mogadishu in August 2010 during its “Ramadan Offensive.”4 Its offensive failed, however, resulting in heavy insurgent losses and the inability to capture the areas of Mogadishu under AMISOM and TFG control.5 A second “Ramadan Offensive” launched one year later could not turn the tide in al-Shabab’s favor.6 By mid-August 2011, al-Shabab had announced a “strategic withdrawal” from Mogadishu and began a guerrilla war in the city against AMISOM and the TFG.7
Despite having withdrawn most of its forces from the capital, al-Shabab operated in outlying districts and exerted influence within Mogadishu.8 It also continued to execute deadly attacks deep inside the city, including vehicle bombings at the Somali Ministry of Education and a military base in October 2011.9 Al-Shabab’s persistent ability to send insurgents and suicide bombers into the city did not stop AMISOM and TFG forces from capturing its bases in Mogadishu’s northern outskirts.10 The city and the surrounding districts, however, would not fully fall to AMISOM and the TFG until four months later when they captured the Suuqa Hoolaha neighborhood in north Mogadishu in March 2012.11
Kenya, citing the increased number of kidnappings carried out in its territory close to the border with Somalia, sent military forces inside the Juba region of southern Somalia in mid-October 2011.12 The Kenyan government also launched a major security sweep in the Eastleigh district of its own capital, Nairobi, targeting suspected al-Shabab “sympathizers.”13 Eastleigh, which is sometimes referred to as “Little Mogadishu,” has long been an important hub for al-Shabab recruitment and is home to extremist preachers and groups, such as the Kenyan Muslim Youth Center.14
In late November 2011, Ethiopian troops entered western Somalia with the goal of pushing back al-Shabab forces from its border.15 The re-entry of the Ethiopian military into the country opened a third front, to the west, against al-Shabab, which was already faced with offensives by AMISOM and the TFG in the north and Kenya and its militia allies in the south. In addition to battlefield setbacks, al-Shabab was faced with renewed pressure on its economic resources. Having lost the Bakara Market in Mogadishu in August 2011, the insurgents suffered from Kenya targeting their logistical and economic networks in the south, where it received significant revenues from taxing local merchants and traders as well as from the trade in charcoal around the Horn of Africa and the Arab Gulf states.16
Continuity with the Past: Refocusing on Guerrilla Warfare
Shortly after al-Shabab’s “strategic withdrawal” from Mogadishu in August 2011, Hasan Dahir Aweys, who was then a member of al-Shabab’s leadership, said in an interview with Somali Channel that the movement would adopt a guerrilla warfare strategy since it was unable to match AMISOM’s military superiority.17 Instead of continuing to launch massive and costly frontline assaults on enemy positions, al-Shabab’s frontline fighting force, Jaysh al-`Usra (Army of Hardship/Difficulty), has since focused primarily on launching hit-and-run style attacks on AMISOM, TFG/Somali government, Kenyan, and Ethiopian forces and their allies.
Rather than make a “final stand” in Mogadishu, Beledweyne, Baidoa, and other strategic urban centers, al-Shabab withdrew from these cities without offering much resistance, although it promised to continue operating militarily in these areas.18 Facing defections, al-Shabab chose to save their always limited number of fighters for a protracted guerrilla war.19 It refocused its military strategy on executing guerrilla-style attacks on enemy checkpoints and other positions and planting improvised explosive devices in supposedly “liberated” areas under AMISOM, Somali government, Kenyan, and Ethiopian control.20 A primary insurgent target, in addition to non-Somali and Somali government forces, were al-Shabab’s militia enemies such as the Somali Sufi fighters of Ahlu-Sunna wal-Jama (People of the Prophetic Tradition) umbrella group, who are labeled “apostates” in al-Shabab’s written statements, videos, radio broadcasts, and other media productions.21
Assassinations of enemy military officers, militia commanders, and Somali government officials have long been an important staple in al-Shabab’s military strategy, and the movement continues to target such officials with varying degrees of success.22 In May 2012, an al-Shabab ambush tried unsuccessfully to assassinate Somali President Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad in the Afgooye corridor south of Mogadishu.23 Such assassinations, while they cannot turn the tide of battle in al-Shabab’s favor, are capable of disrupting enemy forces and preventing the transition to a more stable security and political environment in areas recently liberated from insurgent control. Spies remain a concern for al-Shabab, particularly as it began to lose increasing amounts of territory to its enemies. When captured, suspected spies were quickly executed.24 Similar guerrilla-style attacks were also frequently used by al-Shabab during 2007 and 2008, the first two years of its insurgency against Ethiopian forces, the TFG, and AMISOM.25
In May and June 2012, al-Shabab also reintroduced its “daily news report” format when releasing public statements. In its early years as an underground guerrilla movement, al-Shabab released groups of statements in this format, in which a number of its daily military actions and activities were briefly reported together in a single statement.26 This more simplified version of publishing allowed the insurgents to streamline the process of collecting and publishing their print statements, which made it easier to produce statements while engaging in a more covert insurgency. Whether this is because of new technological challenges is unknown.
Regardless, this shift shows continuity not only between al-Shabab’s military operations in the field, which have shifted back to the movement’s underground guerrilla roots, but also in its media operations.
As its fortunes began to turn during the summer of 2011, al-Shabab was faced with an increasing number of defections, which continued into 2012.27 Exact numbers of defectors, from those who surrendered directly to AMISOM and the Somali government to those who simply abandoned their posts, are not available. Both Somali and foreign media outlets have, however, reported on hundreds of al-Shabab fighters surrendering.28 Defections impacted its ability to respond militarily to offensives by AMISOM, Somali government, Kenyan and Ethiopian troops, and anti-Shabab militias.
In September 2012, al-Shabab suffered defections from at least a segment of Hisbul Islamiyya, a once independent, more Somalia-focused guerrilla group fighting against AMISOM and the TFG. Hisbul Islamiyya was forced to merge with al-Shabab in December 2010 after losing to it militarily on the battlefield in a conflict that lasted throughout that year.29 A reported Kenya-based Hisbul Islamiyya spokesman, Muhammad Mu`allim, recently told reporters that his group’s past allegiance to al-Shabab had been forced and was “by mouth only,” and that al-Shabab’s rapidly declining power allowed them to break free. He said that Hisbul Islamiyya was open to negotiations over the future of Somalia.30 Attempting to put an end to these reports, al-Shabab responded rapidly with a written statement from its military spokesman, Abu Mus`ab. He denied that Mu`allim was an active member of Hisbul Islamiyya, claiming that he had “escaped” to Kenya when the group joined ranks with al-Shabab.31
Al-Shabab was also forced to deal in a public fashion with the separation of Omar Hammami (also known as Abu Mansur al-Amriki), once the insurgents’ most recognizable foreign fighter. After briefly denying his initial March 2012 claim that al-Shabab threatened his life due to “differences” over matters of “Shari`a and strategy,” al-Shabab had to address Hammami’s claims more forcefully when the American continued to make allegations against them in the first part of his autobiography, which was released in May 2012, and in a second video posted to YouTube in which he alleged that al-Shabab treated foreign fighters poorly.32 Hammami also made active use of his Twitter spokesman “Abu American,” who many analysts suspect is actually Hammami himself, in launching allegations against al-Shabab and its allies.33
Al-Shabab, in a lengthy official statement released in December 2012, denied Hammami’s many allegations and said that he “does not, in any way, shape, or form, represent the views” of foreign fighters in Somalia.34 They further labeled Hammami a narcissist interested in public attention and acclaim.35 Al-Shabab also denied the frequent reports in Western media that Hammami was a “grand strategist, recruiter and fundraiser” for the group. They accused Hammami of spreading societal discord (fitna) at a time of great trial for the mujahidin and other Muslims in Somalia.36 Hammami was replaced by a different English-speaking foreign fighter, Abu Ahmad al-Amriki, in another video dedicated to the group’s foreign fighters.37
Perhaps in part to counter Hammami’s allegations with regard to foreign fighters, al-Shabab’s media department, the al-Kataib Media Foundation, released the third installment of its martyrology video series “Profit of the Sale” on February 1, 2013. The video identified a number of al-Shabab martyrs, including the late British-Lebanese fighter Bilal al-Berjawi, who was killed in a reported U.S. drone strike in January 2012.38 Featuring al-Berjawi so prominently in a major video may have been an attempt by al-Shabab to counter these rumors.39
Highlighting the Benefits of Insurgent Rule
As al-Shabab lost territory in the south and west, its media department released a series of videos documenting the movement’s past and present implementation of law and order over previously bandit and thief infested parts of the country. Al-Shabab also claimed to have completed a number of new public works projects despite its battlefield setbacks. These projects included the construction of roads and bridges and the distribution of aid to the needy.40 Al-Shabab also released videos in which Somali civilians discussed their happiness with insurgent rule and concern over the return of foreign troops and their Somali “lackeys.”41 In addition to these projects, al-Shabab undertook other public works initiatives including agricultural programs, opening centers for people with special needs, restoring dams, and distributing food aid.42
In a major video production titled Under the Shade of Shari`a, an English-speaking al-Shabab “journalist” recounted his 2011 trip to the city of Baidoa in western Somalia.43 Contrasting the period of insurgent rule in the city to the days of corruption during the tenure of the TFG, he and al-Kataib cameramen went to great lengths to show the economic benefits allegedly brought to the city by al-Shabab’s implementation of its interpretation of Shari`a.44 The video included extensive footage of a meeting held in 2011 near Baidoa between al-Shabab leaders, including spokesman ‘Ali Rage, and clan leaders, possibly from the Rahanweyn clan group, which predominates in that area.45 Locals and clan leaders interviewed for the video said that they welcomed insurgent rule since it brought stability, which in turn allowed for the rejuvenation of the economy and increased safety for residents.46 During celebrations in Kismayo organized by al-Shabab to mark the formalization of its affiliation with al-Qa`ida in early February 2012, a local clan leader from Juba, Isma`il Harun, praised the “mujahidin” when he appeared alongside al-Shabab’s governor of Kismayo, Hasan Ya`qub, and political bureau official Hussein `Ali Fiidow.47
The locations of al-Shabab’s official celebrations following the formalization of its alliance with al-Qa`ida were chosen for their symbolic political and propaganda value. Despite AMISOM’s advance beyond Mogadishu and the Kenyans’ drive toward Kismayo, the insurgent movement hosted large celebrations in Kismayo, Baidoa and Lafoole, which were attended by a number of its senior leaders, including Rage, Ya`qub, Fiidow, and `Abd al-Qadir Mu’min.48 Less than a month later, Baidoa fell to Ethiopian forces, and Kenya took control of Kismayo in October. In late August 2011, al-Shabab made similar political statements with its choices for locations of communal Eid al-Fitr prayers. One gathering was held in the outskirts of Mogadishu despite the insurgents’ withdrawal from most of the city earlier that month.49
Broadcasting its ability to continue governing has been a priority for al-Shabab even as its setbacks mounted during the past two years. It has continued to organize programs aimed at training preachers and educating merchants and craftsmen as well as distributing aid.50 The group has also continued to focus on pushing forward an education program in areas under its control that conforms to its rigid interpretation of Islam.51
Insurgent outreach to the country’s powerful clans continues, and al-Shabab claims to have received support from a number of clan leaders from the Huber, Gaaljecel and Rahanweyn, as well as other clans and sub-clans.52 Insurgent officials have also sought to mediate clan disputes and hold localized Shari`a court sessions aimed at resolving disagreements between locals and complaints against al-Shabab itself.53
Al-Shabab, in the midst of battlefield defeats and political setbacks, has sought over the past year to respond militarily while continuing to assert its claim to political legitimacy as an insurgent governing authority. It has shifted back to guerrilla tactics and has adopted a more flexible form of collecting and releasing reports from the frontlines. It has continued its attempts to exercise governing authority over areas under its control as well as highlighting small and medium scale public works projects, although this has become increasingly difficult with its loss of the major urban centers.
Despite these setbacks, al-Shabab’s leaders and media operatives understand that, to a significant degree, the appearance of power can be nearly as effective as actual power. Therefore, they have a keen interest in maintaining the ability to project the image of a movement that is both well-rooted in local social structures and capable of launching regular, successful attacks against its enemies—both domestic and foreign.
Christopher Anzalone is a doctoral student in the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University where he studies modern Muslim sociopolitical movements, including transnational jihadist groups, Shi`a Islam, and Islamist visual cultures.
1 For a political map of Somalia showing territorial control in March 2010, see www.newsecuritybeat.org/app/uploads/2012/07/somalia_map.jpg. For a political map showing territorial control as of February 2013, see http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9f/Somalia_map_states_regions_districts.png.
 Jeffrey Gettleman, “Kenyan Forces Enter Somalia to Battle Militants,” New York Times, October 16, 2011.
 “Ethiopian Troops Capture Beledweyne from Somalia Militants,” BBC, December 31, 2011; “Somalia Al-Shabab Militant Base of Baidoa Captured,” BBC, February 22, 2012.
 “Somali Fighters Attack Capital,” al-Jazira, August 27, 2010.
 “Islamic Militants Launch Ramadan Offensive in Famine-stricken Somalia,” CNN, August 1, 2011.
 “Al-Shabab Vows to Use Guerilla Tactics in Somalia,” Voice of America, August 12, 2011; “Somali: Al-Shabab Militants Return to Mogadishu,” Xinhua, August 12, 2011.
 Geoffrey York, “Fear of Al-Shabab Brings Mogadishu to a Standstill,” Globe and Mail, September 16, 2011; “Somalia’s Al Shabaab Warns of More Attacks,” Reuters, October 4, 2011.
 Abdi Sheikh and Mohamed Ahmed, “Rebels Kill Scores in Somali Capital Blast,” Reuters, October 4, 2011; Josh Kron, “Militants Strike at Troops at Base in Somali Capital,” New York Times, October 29, 2011.
 “TFG/AMISOM Secure Remaining Al Shabaab Strongholds in Mogadishu,” AMISOM, press release, October 2011.
 Mahmoud Mohamed, “Mogadishu Liberated from al-Shabaab: Somali Security Officials,” Sabahi, March 5, 2012.
 “Kenyan Troops Move into Somalia,” Associated Press, October 16, 2011; “Kenyan Troops Advance in Somalia, Pursuing Al-Shabab,” Voice of America, October 17, 2011.
 “Kenya to Target al-Shabab Sympathisers in Nairobi,” BBC, October 20, 2011.
 Christopher Anzalone, “Kenya’s Muslim Youth Center and Al-Shabab’s East African Recruitment,” CTC Sentinel 5:10 (2012).
 “Somalia Confirms Ethiopian Troop Presence,” Voice of America, November 20, 2011; Mohamed Ahmed, “Somali Rebels Pull Out as Ethiopian Troops Return,” Reuters, November 21, 2011.
 Gabe Joselow, “Kenyan Military Targeting al-Shabab Finances,” Voice of America, November 6, 2011; John Ngirachu, “Al Shabaab Militia’s Tight Grip on ‘Desert’ Charcoal Trade,” The East African, November 13, 2011; “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2002 (2011),” United Nations, 2011, pp. 147-161.
 “Al-Shabab Vows to Use Guerilla Tactics in Somalia.”
 “The Christian Ethiopian Army is Occupying Baidoa City,” al-Shabab, February 26, 2012.
 “Defections Put Militant al-Shabab on the Run in Somalia,” BBC, June 8, 2012; Abdi Guled, “Al Shabab Defectors Describe Hunger and Isolation with Somali Terrorist Group,” Toronto Star, July 11, 2012; Dominic Wabala, “200 al Shabaab Militias (sic) Surrender,” The Star [Nairobi], September 8, 2012.
 Representative al-Shabab statements include: “Killing Two from the Ethiopian Forces with an IED in the Central Beledweyne,” February 7, 2012; “Setting Off 4 Bombs Against the Crusaders Inside the Maslah Military Camp,” March 4, 2012; “Targeting a Military Helicopter with a Surface-to-air Missile,” March 7, 2012; “Targeting the Presidential Palace with Mortars for a Second Consecutive Night,” March 22, 2012; “Ambush Targeting Ethiopian Forces in the Region of Bay and Bakool,” April 11, 2012; and “Ambush on the Ethiopians near Bardaale city,” May 19, 2012.
 Representative al-Shabab statements include: “Killing Seven Apostates with an IED on Factories Street in Mogadishu,” February 26, 2012; “Targeting an Apostate Officer in Beledweyne with a Hand Grenade,” March 15, 2012; “Killing a Number of Apostates with a Bomb near the Bakara Market,” April 20, 2012; and “News Report for the Day of 26 Shawwal 1433,” September 16, 2012.
 Representative al-Shabab statements include: “Assassination of a Member of the Apostate Intelligence Services in Mogadishu,” March 1, 2012; “Martyrdom Operation Inside the Presidential Palace of the Apostate Government,” March 16, 2012; “Assassination of an Officer from the Apostate Militias in the District of Laba Daqah,” April 4, 2012; and “Killing a Burundian Officer in a Special Operation,” May 14, 2012.
 Abdi Sheikh and Feisal Omar, “Somali President Escapes Rebel Ambush on Convoy,” Reuters, May 29, 2012; “Targeting the Convoy of the Apostate Sharif in Several Ambushes between Mogadishu and Afgooye,” al-Shabab, June 1, 2012.
 Representative al-Shabab statements include: “Assassination of a Spy in the Junaqal District in Mogadishu,” April 28, 2012; “Targeting a House of Spies in the Taleeh district,” May 4, 2012; “Targeting a Group of Apostate Spies with a Car Bomb,” March 24, 2012; and “Assassination of Two Spies near the Bakara Market,” April 28, 2012. For more on al-Shabab’s previous targeting of spies, see Christopher Anzalone, “Al-Shabab’s Setbacks in Somalia,” CTC Sentinel 4:10 (2011).
 Representative al-Shabab statements include: “Claiming the Assassination of Shaker Shafi‘i, an Officer in the Intelligence Department,” September 6, 2007; “Claiming the Assassination of Two Representatives of the Apostate Government,” May 11, 2007; “Explosion in Baidoa Reaps (Kills) Tens of Ethiopians and Apostates,” December 6, 2007; “Assassination of a Leader of Apostate Army Forces in Hiraan, ‘Ali Farah,” April 30, 2008; and “Assassination of a Police Commander, ‘Ali ‘Aduween, with the Detonation of a Landmine under His Convoy in the North Mogadishu,” August 9, 2008.
 In 2007, al-Shabab released a number of reports under the title “Harvest of the Jihad in Somalia” and in 2008 as part of two sustained military campaigns dubbed “No Peace without Islam” and “Our Terrorism is Praiseworthy.”
 “Defections Put Militant al-Shabab on the Run in Somalia”; “Somali Government Displays Al Shabaab Defected Fighters,” Shabelle Media Network, October 22, 2011; Mohammed Yusuf, “Some Al-Shabab Defectors Still a Security Threat,” Voice of America, February 6, 2013.
 “200 al-Shabaab Militants Surrender Outside Jowhar,” Sabahi, September 23, 2012; Michael Mubangizi, “200 al-Shabab Defect—AMISOM,” The Observer [Kampala], September 23, 2012; Patrick Mayoyo, “Shabaab Fighters Surrender,” The Nation [Nairobi], September 5, 2012.
 “Al Shabaab Takes Over Region from Hizbul Islam,” Shabelle Media Network, December 14, 2010.
 “Somalia: Hizbul Islam Group Withdraws Allegiance, says ‘Al Shabaab is Weakened,’” Garowe Online, September 25, 2012.
 “Statement Regarding the Conference in which it was Announced that Hizbul Islam Withdrew from the Union with Harkat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen,” al-Shabab, September 28, 2012.
 Clint Watts, “Hammami’s Twitter War with Shabaab & MYC in Somalia & Kenya,” Selected Wisdom blog, January 14, 2013; Christopher Anzalone, “The End of a Romance? The Rise and Fall of an American Jihadi: Omar Hammami’s Relationship with Somalia’s Al-Shabab,” al-Wasat blog, March 17, 2012. For an overview of Hammami’s political and religious ideology, which is arguably even more global than that of at least a segment of al-Shabab, see Christopher Anzalone, “The Evolution of an American Jihadi: The Case of Omar Hammami,” CTC Sentinel 5:6 (2012).
 “Abu Mansur al-Amriki: A Candid Clarification,” al-Shabab, December 18, 2012.
 Mujahidin Moments, al-Shabab, February 2013. The video features Swahili-speaking foreign fighters in addition to Abu Ahmad al-Amriki.
 Ian Cobain, “British ‘al-Qaida Member’ Killed in US Drone Attack in Somalia,” Guardian, January 22, 2012.
 That being said, al-Berjawi was allegedly involved in a power struggle with al-Shabab’s amir, Ahmed Godane (also known as Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr), and was a victim of group infighting, betrayed by Godane and his supporters. For an overview of these reports, see Clint Watts, “Continued Debate on al-Qaeda in Somalia: Zawahiri, Godane, Robow,” Selected Wisdom blog, March 22, 2012.
 Distribution of Zakat to Some of the Regions in the Islamic Governorate of Juba, al-Shabab, January 2013; Restoration Project of Some of the Roads and Bridges in the Governorate of Juba, al-Shabab, October 2012.
 The Atmosphere in the Port of Kismayo, al-Shabab, August 2012; Tour of the Beaches in the Region of Lower Shabelle—City of Baraawe, al-Shabab, February 2013; Under the Shade of Shari`a, al-Shabab, July 2012.
 Representative al-Shabab statements include: “Agricultural Report,” March 18, 2012; “Sponsorship of 3 Disabled People in the Administrative District of Lafoole,” February 14, 2012; “Restoring a Number of Dams in the Region of Middle Shabelle,” May 8, 2012; “Medical Convoy for the Displaced of Baidoa City,” March 10, 2012; and “Distribution of Food Aid to Those in Need in the Region of Juba,” April 27, 2012.
 Under the Shade of Shari`a.
 The Year of Unity 1433, al-Shabab, April 2012.
 Representative al-Shabab statements include: “Huge Celebrations in Lower Shabelle to Welcome the Bay‘a with Al-Qaeda,” February 14, 2012; “Celebrations in Baidoa City in Support of the Bay‘a with Al-Qaeda,” February 18, 2012; “Joyful Celebrations in Kismayo for the Unity with Al-Qaeda,” February 20, 2012.
 “The Muslims Perform the ‘Eid Prayer in the Islamic Regions,” al-Shabab, August 31, 2011.
 Representative al-Shabab statements include: “Charitable Association Distributes Alms in Bur Hakaba City,” May 4, 2012; “Closing of a Shari‘a Session for Tailors in Baardeere City,” April 28, 2012; “Conclusion of an Educational Session for Merchants in Waajed City,” May 11, 2012; “Third Round of Graduates from the ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam Academy for Preachers,” February 27, 2011.
 “Office of Education Holds a Meeting with Officials of the Educational Institutions,” al-Shabab, February 6, 2012.
 Under the Shade of Shari`a and Bay`a of the Gaaljecel Clan to Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen, al-Shabab, November 2012; “Huber Clan Gives Bay‘a to Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen,” al-Shabab, June 23, 2012.
 “Daawo Sawirada: Shirkii Dib U Heshiisiinta Beelihii Galguduud ku Dagaalamay Oo Wejigiisii 2-aad lasoo Gaba Gabeeyay,” Somali Memo, December 20, 2012; “Completion of the Reconciliation Between 2 Clans in Harardhere,” al-Shabab, April 28, 2012; “Grievances Court in the region of Middle Shabelle Issues Dozens of Rulings,” al-Shabab, March 10, 2012.